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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 
 Paul Scagnelli and James Hamill appeal an order entered by the District Court 
granting summary judgment to Ronald Schiavone.
1
  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will affirm.
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I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we only 
briefly recite the procedural history and essential facts. 
 We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment.  See Liberty 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2012).  Summary 
judgment is only appropriate when there is no issue in dispute regarding any material 
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See id.  A grant of 
summary judgment is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  See 
                                              
1
  Carl Cosenzo was also a plaintiff but he did not appeal the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment. 
 
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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id.  This means that all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant’s favor.  
See id. 
II. 
 Scagnelli and Hamill contend that the District Court erred because (A) there were 
genuine issues of fact concerning the existence of an implied or oral contract, (B) since 
there may have been a contract, their good faith and fair dealing claim should not have 
been dismissed, and (C) the Court decided genuine issues of fact and overlooked caselaw 
in dismissing their promissory estoppel claim.  We disagree. 
A. 
Under New Jersey law,
3
 “[a] contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must 
be sufficiently definite that the performance to be rendered by each party can be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty.”  Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 618-19 (3d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992)).  A contract 
may be: (1) express, including oral or written, (2) implied-in-fact, and (3) implied-in-law.  
See Wanaque Borough Sewerage Authority v. Township of West Milford, 144 N.J. 564, 
574 (1996) (internal quotation omitted).  A contract is “express if the agreement is 
manifested in written or spoken words, and implied-in-fact if the agreement is manifested 
by conduct.”  Id.  By contrast, “‘[c]ontract implied-in-law’ is a somewhat disfavored 
synonym for ‘quasi-contract.’”  Id.  Here, the so-called “Troika” had no enforceable 
contract, express or implied, because of insufficient certainty of the material terms of an 
alleged agreement.  See Morton v. 4 Orchard Land Trust, 849 A.2d 164, 170 (N.J. 2004).  
                                              
3
  The parties do no dispute that New Jersey law governs all claims in this case. 
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The parties never agreed on a specific percentage of sale proceeds to be given to the 
Troika, nor when and how proceeds would be provided.  See Heim v. Shore, 151 A.2d 2d 
556, 562 (N.J. App. Div. 1959) (alleged agreement was too indefinite to constitute a 
contract because “still open for negotiation were the terms of payment, including the 
principal amount of the mortgage, the due date, the interest rate, and the usual provisions 
with respect to default in interest and taxes.”).  Rather than showing the existence of a 
contract, the draft agreements, oral communications, and other conduct indicate that the 
Troika engaged in ongoing negotiations with Schiavone.  Furthermore, the negotiations 
concerned forming an employment agreement with SCC, not Schiavone.  Accordingly, 
the claim for breach of an implied or oral contract fails as a matter of law. 
B. 
 Under New Jersey law, every contract has an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.  See Wilson, et al. v. Amerada Hess Corp., et al., 773 A.2d 1121, 1126-27 
(N.J. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).  As explained by the District Court, Scagnelli 
and Hamill’s claim under this theory fails because there was no contract from which an 
implied covenant could arise.  See Noye v. Hoffmann-La Rouche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1990) (“In the absence of a contract, there can be no breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
C. 
 “Promissory estoppel is made up of four elements:  (1) a clear and definite 
promise; (2) made with the expectations that the promisee will rely on it; (3) reasonable 
reliance; and (4) definite and substantial detriment.”  Toll Bros., Inc., et al. v. Board of 
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Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, et al., 944 A.2d 1, 19 (N.J. 2008).  “Under 
New Jersey law, the sine qua non of a promissory estoppel claim is a clear and definite 
promise.”  Ross v. Celtron Int’l, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 288, 296 (D.N.J. 2007).  As Judge 
Cooper clearly explained in her carefully crafted and thorough opinion, Scagnelli and 
Hamill’s promissory estoppel claim fails because Schiavone’s promise to “do something” 
or “take care of” the Troika was vague in the extreme.  See Del Sontro v. Cedant Corp., 
223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 574 (D.N.J. 2001) (“Indefinite promises or promises subject to 
change by the promisor are not ‘clear and definite’ and cannot give rise to a claim of 
promissory estoppel.”); Automated Salvage Transport, Inc., etc., et al. v. NV Koninklijke 
KNP BT, et al., 106 F. Supp. 2d 606, 622 (D.N.J. 1999) (“Plaintiffs point to many alleged 
misrepresentations made by [defendant].  They fail, however, to single out a concrete 
promise.”) (emphasis added). 
III. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Schiavone. 
